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Widow · (This post was last modified: 09-28-2020, 06:28 AM by Widow.)

3: THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES

3.1: Debris damage/penetration

Debris damage and/or penetration has the potential to not only damage and number of components including the windows, solar panel arrays, or external fluid and power lines; it has the potential to destroy Chesterfield Station. In some circumstances, debris may also cause injury or loss of life to crew members aboard Chesterfield Station. Deep Space Engineering has spent some time researching this and has begun to incorporate designs that may prevent debris from being a major issue in the future, specifically constructing a shield module which will assist greatly in protecting the station and any crew aboard.

3.2: Collision with visiting vehicles

An inadvertent collision with a visiting vehicle could lead to the loss of crew members and/or the loss of Chesterfield Station. It should be noted that the safety-related requirements for visiting vehicles are the same regardless of which affiliation the spacecraft has, and the vessel's history. The visiting spacecraft is responsible for the development, delivery, and final verification of their vessel, but the Deep Space Engineering has the responsibility for the overall safety of the Chesterfield Station which encompasses visiting vehicles. Deep Space Engineering are responsible for safety requirements definition and review and approval of safety hazard identification and mitigation steps. Chesterfield Station has a multi-tiered approach to ensuring the safety of integrated operations with visiting vehicles. The first tier defines basic design criteria to ensure that the visiting vehicles are capable of berthing or docking to Chesterfield Station. The second tier establishes further protection against unexpected conditions through crew command and monitoring. The crew monitors the contact or capture conditions using visual targets. Commanding is a shared responsibility. The third tier of safety protection requires demonstration of key capabilities during the vessel's flight to Chesterfield Station. This is reflected in the detailed planning of all flights to and from the station. These carefully constructed layers provide confidence that the visiting vehicle has a functioning design and the operational controls are in place to prevent a collision.

3.3: Pressure loss

In the event of a rapid loss of cabin pressure software developed by Deep Space Engineering automatically closes the overboard vacuum vent valves, turns off the cabin fans, and closes the inter-module ventilation valves between the segments. Crew members will attempt to determine the station’s status and whether the leak can be isolated/repaired or if they are required to abandon the station.

3.4: Fire

Consistent with other hazards, fire prevention is the primary control of the fire threat on board Chesterfield Station. The potential for a fire is mitigated through focusing on carefully specified materials use; and careful selection and application of electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) components. Deep Space Engineering have developed smoke detectors, which are located throughout the station, and these are the primary methods of fire detection. Fire response equipment includes carbon dioxide (CO2) fire extinguishers and a water-based foam extinguishers. Portable oxygen (O2) masks are available throughout the station.

3.5: Toxic spills

The types and quantities of materials on board Chesterfield Station that could lead to loss of life or the station are vastly more limited than those that could lead to crew health concerns or abandonment of the station. The primary means of controlling toxic spills is by controlling the types and quantities of toxic materials that are used on Chesterfield Station. Robust containment methods are required when toxic materials are required for all operations or research. If all controls were to fail and in the unlikely event a toxic substance was release did occur, the crew would respond to the event by donning toxic response equipment and isolating the module where the spill occurred.

3.6: Contaminant Exposure

Chemicals are a major risk to crew members aboard Chesterfield Station. The primary threat to crew members aboard the station is hydrazine from any number of thrusters. Hydrazine inhalation may cause illness or loss of life. Hydrazine is an inorganic compound. It is a simple pnictogen hydride, and is a colorless and flammable liquid with an ammonia-like odor. The only safe method to handle this is if it is a solution. Deep Space Engineering implements operational controls to prevent exposure to this wherever possible. The hydrazine-exhausting thrusters have a minimum 'safe zone' in place to prevent any possibility of exposure to crew in Chesterfield station. This includes the prohibition of use of thrusters while docking with, and leaving Chesterfield Station. In case of risk of contamination, cleaning procedures are in place.

3.7: Catastrophic system failure

Catastrophic failure of any system as part of the Chesterfield Station could lead to crew member or station damage/loss. Sound design specification, and rigorous hardware and software testing are pivotal components of eliminating hazards and protecting against catastrophic system failures. If a hazard cannot be mitigated by design and operational requirements, the probability, severity, and risk-mitigating factors associated with that hazard are assessed by the program and a determination is made as to whether the item may be used as-is or whether an alternative must be found and a redesign undertaken.

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